Abstract. This paper surveys RSA-type implementations based on Lucas sequences and on elliptic curves. The main focus is the way how some known attacks on RSA were extended to LUC, KMOV and Demytko's system. It also gives some directions for the choice of the most appropriate RSA-type system for a given application.
Introduction
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [63] introduced the so-called RSA cryptosystem. Its security mainly relies on the difficulty of factoring carefully chosen large integers.
After this breakthrough, other structures were proposed to produce analogues to RSA. So, Müller and Nöbauer [54, 55] presented a cryptosystem using Dickson polynomials. This system was afterwards slightly modified and rephrased in terms of Lucas sequences by Smith and Lennon [70, 72] . More recently, Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone [41] exhibited new one-way trapdoor functions similar to RSA on elliptic curves, the so-called KMOV cryptosystem. Later, Demytko [20] also pointed out a new one-way trapdoor function on elliptic curves to produce an analogue of RSA.
There are numerous mathematical attacks on RSA. They can basically be classified into three categories independently of the protocol in use for encryption or signature:
1. attacks exploiting the polynomial structure of RSA [11, 14, 25, 29, 47, 57] ; 2. attacks based on its homomorphic nature [2, 7, 15, 17, 19, 22, 21, 16, 26] ; 3. attacks resulting of a bad choice of parameters [74] .
Most of known attacks on RSA can more or less successfully be extended to their Lucas and elliptic curves based analogues. Rather than reviewing in details all the attacks, we have chosen three representative attacks (one per category) and explain how there were extended. This enables the reader to evaluate the potential danger of a future attack on a RSA-type cryptosystem.
The first category of attacks relies on the polynomial structure of RSA. Since Lucas sequences can be expressed in terms of Dickson polynomials, all these attacks can almost straightforwardly be adapted. Using division polynomials, the same conclusion holds for elliptic curves based cryptosystems. The GCD attack [14] falls into this category.
The second type of attacks does not extend so easily to LUC or Demytko's system, because their non homomorphic nature. Therefore, they apparently seem to be resistant. However, multiplicative attacks can sometimes be rewritten in order to be applicable on these latter systems. We shall illustrate this topic with the common modulus attack [68] .
The last category of attacks does not really result from a weakness of RSA but rather from a bad implementation. Parameters have to be carefully chosen. Unfortunately, there is no general recipe to extend this kind of attack. In some cases, attacks remain valid like for the low secret exponents attack [74] .
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the Lucas-based cryptosystems, and the elliptic curves RSA cryptosystems in Section 3. Next, in Section 4, we present the GCD attack, the common modulus failure and the Wiener's attack. We also outline the way they were extended. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Lucas-based cryptosystems
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic properties of RSA.
Lucas sequences.
Definition 2.1. Let P and Q be integers, and let α be a root of the polynomial
, where ∆ = P 2 − 4Q is a non-square.
and its conjugate
, the Lucas sequences {U n } n≥0 and {V n } n≥o are given by
In particular, U 0 = 0, U 1 = 1, V 0 = 2 and V 1 = P . Proposition 2.2. Let U i (P, Q) and V i (P, Q), the i th terms of the Lucas sequences with parameters P , Q and ∆ = P 2 − 4Q. Then,
Identity (2.8) enables to construct a RSA-like cryptosystem based on Lucas sequences with parameters P , Q = 1 and ∆ = P 2 − 4.
2.2. LUC [70, 72] . Each user chooses two large primes p and q, and publishes the product n = pq. Next, he chooses a public encryption key e that is relatively prime to (p − 1), (p + 1), (q − 1) and (q + 1). Finally, he computes the secret decryption key d according to
To send a message m to Bob, Alice looks to Bob's public key e and computes the ciphertext c = V e (m, 1) mod n. Next, to recover the plaintext m, Bob uses his secret decryption key d to obtain
Proof. From Equation (2.4) and Proposition 2.3, we have
Apparently, the drawback in this method is that d depends on the message m because ∆ = m 2 − 4. In fact, according to the values of (∆/p) and (∆/q), there are four possibilities for d that satisfy relation (2.9). However, the decryption key corresponding to a given message can be determined a priori since
Remark 2.4. It is possible to construct a message independent cryptosystem, taking
). This method avoids the computation of the two Legendre symbols in the expression of Ψ(n), but it doubles the length of the deciphering key, on average.
Elliptic curves RSA cryptosystems
3.1. Basic facts.
Definition 3.1. Let K be a field of characteristic = 2, 3, and let x 3 + ax + b (where a, b ∈ K) be a cubic with no multiple roots. An elliptic curve E(a, b) over K is the set of points (x, y) ∈ K × K satisfying the equation
together with a single element denoted O and called the point at infinity. Let P, Q ∈ E(a, b), let be the line connecting P and Q (tangent line if P = Q), and let T be the third point of intersection of with E(a, b). If is the line connecting T and O, then P + Q is the point such that intersects E(a, b) at T, O and P + Q. 
where |a p | ≤ 2 √ p. 
For some special cases, the order and the structure of an elliptic curve can easily be determined. 
3.2. Elliptic curves over the ring Z n . In this paragraph, n will denote the product of two large distinct primes p and q. Definition 3.8. Like the definition over the field F p , an elliptic curve E n (a, b) over the ring Z n is the set of the points (x, y) ∈ Z n × Z n satisfying the equation
together with the point O.
However, the resulting structure is not a group ; nevertheless a proposition similar to Lagrange's theorem holds.
It is possible (but very unlikely) that the addition of two points on E n (a, b) is undefined. In practice, this will cause no problem, because the probability of finding two points such that their sum is undefined is the same than finding the two prime factors of n. Proposition 3.9 seems to establish a RSA-type cryptosystem. However, some problems occur. Suppose that Alice wants to send message m to Bob. Bob fixes an elliptic curve E n (a, b) over Z n and computes N n = cm (#E p (a, b), #E q (a, b) ). He chooses a public key e that is relatively prime to N n , and computes d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod N n ). The values of e and n, and the elliptic curve E n (a, b) are public. To encode the message m, Alice represents it, in a publicly known way, as a point M of the elliptic curve E n (a, b) (by adding redundancy, for example). Then she computes C = eM and sends C to Bob. To recover the message m, Bob uses his secret key d to compute dC = deM = M. This scheme is not correct because several messages may be represented by the same point M. Therefore, Proposition 3.9 can only be used to construct a signature scheme. Another idea is to let Alice choosing the parameters a and b of the elliptic curve in order to uniquely represent m as a point of the curve. But in that case, N n (which has to be re-computed by Bob) is not necessarily coprime to e. To overcome these drawbacks, new schemes were proposed.
3.3. KMOV [41] . The KMOV system relies on Lemma 3.6. Each user chooses two primes p and q both congruent to 2 modulo 3, and publishes their product n = pq. Next, he selects a public key e relatively prime to N n = cm(p + 1, q + 1) and computes the secret key d such to .7) 3.4. Demytko [20] . In this cryptosystem, each user chooses once for all the parameters a, b and e. Let m be the message to be encoded. The Demytko's system is based on the fact that if m (modulo p) is not the x-coordinate of a point on E p (a, b), it will be the x-coordinate of a point on the twisted curve E p (a, b) .
It is useful to introduce some notation. Since the computation of the y-coordinate can be avoided (by using the algorithm described in [8] , for example), k p x will denote the x-coordinate of k times the point P = (p x , p y ). 
Since the message m 1 is a root of P and Q, m 1 will be a root of gcd(P, Q) which is, with a high probability, a polynomial of degree 1. Solving this polynomial in x gives the value of m 1 , and m 2 = m 1 + ∆. This attack was later generalized to any known polynomial relation between the messages and to any number of messages [14] .
On the other hand, by expressing Lucas sequences as Dickson polynomials [49] , Joye and Quisquater [34] proved the same result for LUC. Using division polynomials [66, Chap. 3, exercice 3.7], they also extended this attack to the KMOV and Demytko cryptosystems. Since the polynomial relation is of order e 2 for elliptic curves systems [34] , the attack applies for public exponent up to 16 bits, instead of 32 bits as for RSA and LUC.
Furthermore, by lattice basis reduction techniques [48] , Coppersmith [13] showed that if ∆ (the difference between the two messages) is unknown, then m 1 and m 2 can sometimes be recovered. In fact, let (∆) be the resultant in x of P and Q, which is an univariate polynomial in ∆. It is possible to solve this polynomial if the solution ∆ is smaller than n 1/k , where n is the public modulus and k is the degree of . Since k = e 2 for RSA and LUC, and k = e 4 for elliptic curves system, KMOV and Demytko's cryptosystems tolerate smaller random padding.
4.2.
The common modulus attack. Since RSA is multiplicative, the knowledge of two ciphertexts c 1 = m e1 mod n and c 2 = m e2 mod n of the message m enables to recover message m, if the same modulus n is used and if the public encryption keys e 1 and e 2 are relatively prime. Indeed, since gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = 1, by the extended Euclidean algorithm [38] , there exists r, s ∈ Z such that re 1 + se 2 = 1. This was first noticed by Simmons [68] .
KMOV is also homomorphic and is therefore susceptible to the same attack. This is not the case for LUC and Demytko's system. However, Bleichenbacher, Bosma and Lenstra [5] presented a signature forgery against LUC that requires two chosen signatures. Kaliski [36] established the same result for the Demytko's system. In his PhD. thesis, Bleichenbacher [3] shows how to forge a LUC signature from only one other signature. This was later adapted to Demytko's system [6] . This enables to exhibit the common modulus protocol failure as follows. We shall only illustrate the attack on LUC and refer to [6] for the attack on Demytko's system.
Let (e 1 , d 1 ) and (e 2 , d 2 ) be two pairs of encryption/decryption keys and let n be the public modulus. Assuming e 1 relatively prime to e 2 , let us use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find integers r and s such that re 1 + se 2 = 1. From the two ciphertexts c 1 = V e 1 (m, 1) mod n and c 2 = V e 2 (m, 1) mod n, we find the message m by
Proof. From (2.7) and (2.3), it follows
Hence,
4.3. The Wiener's attack. Wiener [74] pointed out that if the secret key d was chosen too small, then it might be recovered. He observed that when writing
Following the presentation of Pinch [58] , the attack of Wiener can be illustrated as follows. So, if the condition of the previous theorem is fulfilled, then k/(dg) is a continued approximant for e/n. Since e/n is public and since continued fractions can easily be computed, it is possible to find the secret exponent d under certain assumptions. More precisely, Wiener proved the following corollary. Later, Pinch [58] proved the same result for the LUC and KMOV cryptosystems. He also extended this attack to Demytko's cryptosystem by using Theorem 3.3, and proved that the attack will succeed for secret exponents of order at most n 1/8 .
Concluding remarks
The security of RSA-type systems are based on the difficulty of factoring the public modulus n. Against polynomial attacks, LUC presents no advantage comparatively to RSA because the degree of the polynomial is the same. This is not the case for elliptic curves RSA systems, where the degree is squared. Multiplicativelike attacks on LUC and KMOV/Demytko's system are not as general as for RSA, since the messages are precisely related. However, in some cases, they offer no advantage as in the common modulus failure, for example.
As mentioned in the introduction, the last type of attacks cannot really be considered as an attack. If the parameters are carefully chosen, RSA-type cryptosystems are considered to be secure.
Although Lucas based or elliptic curves based implementations are more timeconsuming, they may offer some advantages in terms of security. Unfortunately, we cannot give a definitive answer to "What is the best RSA-type cryptosystem?". Given the state of the art, only the application will enable to choose the most adequate cryptosystem.
